这句话来自哲学家康德，最近频繁被引用。罗振宇老师在跨年演讲中浓墨重彩地致敬了，罗翔老师、刘擎老师也分别在不同的节目中提到它。也许整个社会都到了要重温这样一个声音的时期。
我也谈一点心理学层面的理解。
手段的意思，就是另有目的。手段只有实现其目的才有价值。把人当成手段，就是把价值建立在通过「人」实现一点别的什么上。那么康德说：没有别的，人成为「人」已经是终极的价值了。
心理学是基于现实的学科。相比这种对宏大价值的讨论——比如人何以成为「人」——我们更关心的是： 它对于普通人的生活意义何在？事实证明，这个命题影响了大多数人的 生活体验，它牵涉到我们在日常生活中的，一种时时刻刻的隐秘的自我拷问： 我是否还有比现在更值得的活法？
比如，多创造点价值，会不会更好？
听上去是很积极的人生观。可一旦接受它，也就要接受它的推论：创造的价值少了，人生就（相对）没有意义。而无法创造价值的人，对这个世界就是可有可无的存在。这是必须警惕的观念。
人可以创造价值，这只是他工具性的一面。 但人绝不等同于自己创造的价值。我花一小时赚100块钱，而我这段时间并非只值这100块而已。否则，是否给我100块，再把这一小时从我生命中抹掉，我没有任何损失呢？——再推一步，是否给一个人足够多的钱，就可以买断他的生命呢？
结论当然很荒谬。荒谬的起点始于把人当成手段，简化为交换某一个产出——100块也好，造福世人也好——的筹码。这必定导向人自身存在的危机：假如有人一小时挣2000块，我该怎么办呢？是否他们同等的生命比我更有份量？假如我身边就有这样的人，我的人生是否就不值得一活？
这是一旦开始就不能回头的歧途。
有一个关于登山的隐喻说：人为什么要登山呢？就因为 山在那里。——而不是山顶上有什么荣誉或是秘宝。如果把登山的意义看成必须到达山顶， 假如不幸没有到达呢（迷路了，路被堵死了，或者登上山顶发现什么都没有 ），整个旅途都将变得一文不值。所以，登山的意义只能在于登山。
活着的意义也只是活着，而非做到了什么就会有额外的增值。活着就是活着本身，活着的同时顺便做到一些事。多或者少，好或者坏，那些事当然可以被评价被比较，但不涉及到人的价值命题。
这不是从哲学的角度论证一套理想主义的说辞。而是站在心理学的立场，一个人要保持对生活的热情（或者说得消极点，保持不那么抑郁），在没什么值得夸耀的丰功伟业时，只能多用一用这种价值判断。当然了，满世界都是「你明明什么都没做，这话只不过是给自己找借口」的噪音，在多大程度上能保持这种观念不受影响，那是另一回事。
心理咨询师考虑问题很实际。如果对整个「人生」保持这样一种态度有些强人所难， 不妨从一个小时开始。每天拿出一个小时时间，其他时候你可以忙忙碌碌，用产出多少为时间定价。但这一个小时是属于你的。这一小时是目的，不是手段。
你想怎么用它就怎么用。
这不等于要你什么都不做，想做什么随便你 。只是不用给你做的事标价，一旦标价就会一步一步落入前面的陷阱：我用一个小时做咨询可以赚几百块，却用它写了这篇文章，只换到比如几十块钱的打赏，那这段时间就不划算。更不用说拿来睡觉或是看风景，一毛钱产出都没有。这样推论下去，一秒钟都浪费不起，总是能找到更有效率的方式安排眼前这一刻（哪怕连睡眠都应该很高效）。
人就把最后一点「人」的属性也异化了。
收回来，不要标价。
只要不标价，它就是无价的。度过这一小时本身是这一小时的主要目的，至于实现了什么根本不重要。一个小孩趴在地上一小时，画一幅自己也不甚满意的涂鸦，然后漫不尽心地忘在脑后。但他度过的这段时间仍然充实且快乐。与一个把画稿拍卖出天价的艺术家不分高下。再退一步，不充实不快乐又怎么样？那也是一个人度过一小时啊。
试试看，说不定在不追求做成什么的心态下，没有负担，反而能不知不觉地做成一些事呢？
在无所用心时产出的结果，也许没有价值，也可能价值不菲。但这个说法最好到此为止。否则，这段时间也会被当成「为达成某种意外惊喜而刻意布置」的手段。就像人们经常问的：「这样做有什么好处？」事实是未必有好处，但每个人仍然需要有一些时间像这样活着。因为人毕竟是人。
Immanuel Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
伊曼纽尔·康德 道德形而上学的基础
https://dbs-lin.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/personalitaet/index.php?cp=document&id=32
(1785)
Section Two
Transition from popular moral wisdom to the metaphysics of morals
第二节
从大众道德智慧到道德形而上学的转变
<...> Now I say: the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not just as a means for any use for this or that will, but must in all his be directed towards himself as well as towards others actions directed at rational beings can at all times also be regarded as ends. All objects of affection have only a conditional value; for if the affections and needs based on them were not there, their object would be worthless. But the inclinations themselves, as sources of want, have so little absolute worth to desire them themselves, that rather to be wholly free of them must be the common desire of every rational being.
现在我说：人类和一般意义上的每一个理性存在本身都是作为目的而存在的，而不仅仅是作为实现这个或那个意志的任何用途的手段，而是必须在他的所有行为中都指向他自己以及指向他人的行为 理性存在者在任何时候都可以被视为目的。 所有感情对象都只有一个有条件的价值； 因为如果基于它们的情感和需求不存在，它们的对象就毫无价值。 但是，作为匮乏之源的倾向本身并没有什么绝对价值去渴望它们本身，以致于完全摆脱它们必定是每一个有理性的人的共同愿望。
Therefore the value of all objects to be acquired through our action is always conditioned. the beings, whose existence does not depend on our will but on nature, but if they are unreasonable beings they have only a relative value, as means, and are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already designates them as ends characterizes itself, ie as something that must not be used merely as a means, thus insofar as it limits all arbitrariness (and is an object of respect).
因此，通过我们的行动获得的所有对象的价值总是有条件的。 存在者，其存在不取决于我们的意志，而是取决于自然，但如果它们是非理性的存在者，那么它们只有相对价值，即手段，因此被称为事物，而理性的存在者被称为人，因为他们的本性已经将他们指定为 目的将自身特征化，即不能仅仅作为手段使用的东西，因此就它限制所有的任意性而言（并且是尊重的对象）。
These are not, therefore, merely subjective ends, the existence of which has value for us as the effect of our action; but objective ends, i.e. things whose existence is in itself an end, and such an end in place of which no other end can be set, which they should only serve as a means, because without this nothing of absolute value would be found anywhere become;
因此，这些不仅仅是主观目的，它们的存在作为我们行动的结果对我们来说是有价值的； 但客观目的，即其存在本身就是目的的事物，这种目的不能设置其他目的，它们只能作为一种手段，因为没有这个，任何地方都找不到绝对价值 ;
So if there is to be a supreme practical principle and a categorical imperative with regard to the human will, it must be one that derives from the conception of what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, an objective constitutes the principle of the will, and can therefore serve as a general practical law. The reason for this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.
This is how man necessarily imagines his own existence; so far, therefore, it is a subjective principle of human actions. In the same way, however, every other rational being imagines its existence according to the same rationale that also applies to me [2].; therefore it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical reason, all laws of the will must be able to be derived. The practical imperative will therefore be as follows: act in such a way that you use humanity both in your person and in the person of everyone else at all times as an end and never merely as a means. We want to see if this can be done.
这就是人必然想象自己存在的方式； 因此，到目前为止，它是人类行为的主观原则。 然而，以同样的方式，每一个其他有理性的人都根据同样适用于我的基本原理来想象它的存在 [2]。 因此，它同时也是一个客观原则，作为最高的实践理性，所有意志法则都必须能够从中推导出来。 因此，实际的命令如下：以这样一种方式行事，即您始终将人性和其他所有人的人性作为目的，而不仅仅是作为手段。 我们想看看这是否可以做到。
To stay with the previous examples, first of all, after the concept of the necessary duty to oneself, the one who deals with suicide will ask himself whether his action can coexist with the idea of ??humanity as an end in itself. If, in order to escape from a difficult condition, he destroys himself, he is using a person merely as a means of maintaining a tolerable condition until the end of life. But man is not a thing, and therefore not something that can only be used as a means, but must always be regarded as an end in himself in all his actions. Therefore I can dispose of nothing over the man in my person, to maim, to spoil, or to kill him. (The more detailed definition of this principle to avoid any misunderstanding, e.g. the amputation of limbs to save myself, the danger I expose my life to in order to save my life, etc., I must pass by here; it belongs to actual morality.)
Secondly, as far as the necessary or owed duty towards others is concerned, he who intends to make a lying promise towards others will immediately see that he only wants to use another person as a means, without the latter at the same time having the end in it abstain. Because the one whom I want to use for my intentions by such a promise cannot possibly agree with my way of proceeding against him and therefore himself contain the purpose of this action. This conflict with other people's principles becomes more apparent when examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others are cited. For then it is clear that the violator of the rights of men is minded to use the person of others merely as a means, without considering[3] .
其次，就对他人的必要或应尽的义务而言，有意向他人作出虚假承诺的人会立即看到他只是想利用他人作为手段，而后者同时没有目的 在其中弃权。 因为我想要通过这样的承诺来实现我的意图的那个人不可能同意我对他采取行动的方式，因此他自己包含了这个行动的目的。 当引用攻击他人自由和财产的例子时，这种与他人原则的冲突变得更加明显。 因为很明显，侵犯人权者的意图只是将他人作为一种手段，而不考虑
Thirdly, with regard to the contingent (meritorious) duty to oneself, it is not enough that the action does not conflict with humanity in our person as an end in itself, it must also agree with it. Now there are in mankind dispositions for greater perfection, which belong to the purpose of nature in regard to mankind in our subject; to neglect this would at best be the preservation of mankind as an end in itself, but not the advancement of this end.
第三，关于对自己的偶然（功绩）义务，行为本身不与我们人的人性冲突是不够的，它还必须符合它。 现在，人类有追求更完美的倾向，这属于我们主题中关于人类的自然目的； 忽视这一点充其量只是将保护人类本身作为目的，而不是促进这一目的。
Fourth, in regard to meritorious duty to others, the natural end that all men have is their own happiness. Now mankind would be able to survive if nobody contributed anything to the happiness of others, but at the same time deliberately did not deprive it of anything; but this is only a negative and not a positive agreement with mankind as an end in itself, even if everyone does not try to promote the ends of others, as much as he is. For the subject, which is an end in itself, whose ends must also, as far as possible, be my ends if that idea is to have any effect on me.
第四，关于对他人的功劳，所有人的自然目的都是自己的幸福。 现在，如果没有人为他人的幸福做出任何贡献，但同时又不刻意剥夺任何东西，人类就能生存下去； 但这只是消极而非积极地同意人类本身就是目的，即使每个人都不像他那样努力促进他人的目的。 因为主题本身就是一个目的，如果那个想法要对我产生任何影响，它的目的也必须尽可能地成为我的目的。
This principle of humanity and of every rational nature in general, as an end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of the freedom of action of every human being) is not borrowed from experience: firstly because of its universality, since it applies to all rational beings in general goes, about which no experience is sufficient to determine something; Secondly, because in it mankind is not the goal of human beings (subjective), that is, as an object that one really makes one's own goal, but as an objective goal which, whatever goals we want, as law is the supreme limiting condition is supposed to make up all subjective ends, and consequently it must arise from pure reason. For the ground of all practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and the form of universality, which makes it capable of being a law (at most natural law) (according to the first principle), but subjectively in the purpose; but the subject of all ends is every rational being, as an end in itself (according to the second principle): from this now follows the third practical principle of the will, as the supreme condition of its agreement with universal practical reason, the idea of ??the will of every rational one Essence as a general legislative will.
这种人性和一般理性本性的原则，本身就是目的（这是每个人行动自由的最高限制条件），不是从经验中借用的：首先是因为它的普遍性，因为它适用于 一般而言，所有有理性的人都会去，没有经验足以确定某事； 其次，因为人在其中并不是人的目标（主观的），即作为一个客体而真正成为自己的目标，而是作为一个客观的目标，无论我们想要什么目标，作为法律是最高限制条件 应该构成所有主观目的，因此它必须来自纯粹理性。 因为所有实际立法的基础客观上在于规则和普遍性的形式，这使得它能够成为法律（至多是自然法）（根据第一原则），但主观上在于目的； 但是所有目的的主体是每一个有理性的存在，作为目的本身（根据第二原则）：由此得出意志的第三实践原则，作为意志与普遍实践理性一致的最高条件，理念 每一个理性的本质的意志作为一般的立法意志。
All maxims are rejected according to this principle which cannot coexist with the will's own general legislation. The will is therefore not only subjected to the law, but is so subjected that it must also be regarded as self-legislating and for that very reason it must be considered subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).
所有格言都根据这一原则拒绝??，该原则无法与遗嘱自己的一般立法共存。 遗嘱不仅有法律，而且被认为是如此，因此必须将其视为自我立法，因此，它被视为遵守法律（可以将其视为作者的法律）。
The imperatives according to the previous mode of representation, namely the general lawfulness of actions similar to a natural order, or the general preference of rational beings in terms of their purpose, excluded from their commanding regard any admixture of any interest as a driving force, precisely because they were presented as categorical ; but they were only accepted as categorical, because one had to assume this if one wanted to explain the concept of duty. But that there are practical propositions that categorically command could not be proved in itself, just as it cannot be done here in this section; but one thing could have happened, namely: that the renunciation of all interest in wanting out of duty,
根据先前表示方式的命令，即类似于自然秩序的行为的普遍合法性，或理性存在者在其目的方面的普遍偏好，排除在命令之外，将任何利益的任何混合物视为驱动力， 正是因为它们被呈现为绝对的； 但它们只是被接受为绝对的，因为如果想解释责任的概念，就必须假设这一点。 但是，有些实际命题无法直接证明，就像本节中无法证明一样； 但是可能会发生一件事，即：放弃所有兴趣而想逃避责任，
For if we think of such a thing, although a will which is under laws may still be bound by an interest to that law, yet a will which is itself supremely legislative cannot possibly depend so far from any interest; for such a dependent will would itself require another law, which would limit the interest in its self-love to the condition of validity as a general law.
因为如果我们想到这样一件事，虽然受法律约束的意志仍可能受法律利益的约束，但本身具有最高立法性的意志不可能如此远离任何利益； 因为这种从属意志本身将需要另一条法则，该法则将其自爱的兴趣限制在作为一般法则的有效性条件。
Thus the principle of every human will, as a will that universally legislates through all its maxims [4], if only it were correct otherwise, to the categorical imperative in that it is not based on any interest for the sake of the idea of ??universal legislation and therefore can only be unconditional among all possible imperatives; or better still, by reversing the proposition: if there is a categorical imperative (i.e. a law for every will of a rational being), then it can only command everything to be done from the maxim of its will as such that it is at the same time itself as a general legislative object; for only then is the practical principle and the imperative, which he obeys, unconditional, because he cannot have any interest as a basis.
因此，每个人的意志的原则，作为一种通过其所有格言普遍立法的意志 [4]，只要它在其他方面是正确的，就绝对命令而言，因为它不是基于任何为了利益的想法而产生的利益。 普遍立法，因此在所有可能的命令中只能是无条件的； 或者更好的是，通过颠倒命题：如果存在绝对命令（即针对理性存在者的每一个意志的法则），那么它只能命令一切按照其意志的准则来完成，即它处于 同时本身作为一般立法对象； 因为只有这样，他所遵守的实践原则和命令才是无条件的，因为他不能以任何利益为基础。
It is no wonder, when we look back at all previous efforts that have ever been made to discover the principle of morality, why they must all have failed. Man was seen as being bound by laws through his duty, but it did not occur to him that he was only subject to his own and yet general legislation, and that he was only bound in accordance with his own will, which according to the natural purpose is universally legislative act. For if one only thought of him as subject to a law (whatever it may be), then this had to carry some interest as a stimulus or compulsion, because it did not arise as a law from his will, but was legally compelled by something else to act in a certain way. Through this quite necessary conclusion, however, all the work of finding a supreme ground of duty was irretrievably lost. Because you never got duty, but necessity of the action out of a certain interest. This might now be one's own or someone else's interest. But then the imperative always had to be conditional and could not be used as a moral commandment. I will therefore call this principle the principle of the autonomy of the will in contrast to every other principle, which I therefore count among heteronomy. But then the imperative always had to be conditional and could not be used as a moral commandment. I will therefore call this principle the principle of the autonomy of the will in contrast to every other principle, which I therefore count among heteronomy. But then the imperative always had to be conditional and could not be used as a moral commandment. I will therefore call this principle the principle of the autonomy of the will in contrast to every other principle, which I therefore count among heteronomy.
难怪，当我们回顾以前为发现道德原则所做的所有努力时，为什么他们一定都失败了。 人被视为通过他的义务而受到法律的约束，但他没有想到他只受制于他自己的一般立法，他只是按照他自己的意志受到约束，而他的意志是根据自然的 目的是普遍的立法行为。 因为如果一个人仅仅认为他受制于法律（无论它是什么），那么这就必须带有某种刺激或强制的兴趣，因为它不是作为法律从他的意志中产生的，而是被某种东西合法地强制的 否则以某种方式行事。 然而，由于这个非常必要的结论，所有寻找责任的最高基础的工作都无可挽回地失败了。 因为你从来没有义务，而是出于某种利益而采取行动的必要性。 这现在可能是自己或其他人的兴趣。 但是命令总是必须是有条件的，不能用作道德诫命。 因此，我将把这个原则称为意志自主的原则，以与所有其他原则形成对比，因此我将其归入他律。 但是命令总是必须是有条件的，不能用作道德诫命。 因此，我将把这个原则称为意志自主的原则，以与所有其他原则形成对比，因此我将其归入他律。 但是命令总是必须是有条件的，不能用作道德诫命。 因此，我将把这个原则称为意志自主的原则，以与所有其他原则形成对比，因此我将其归入他律。
The concept of every rational being, which must regard itself through all maxims of its will as universally legislative, in order to judge itself and its actions from this point of view, leads to a very fruitful concept attached to it, namely that of a kingdom of ends.
But by a kingdom I understand the systematic union of different rational beings through common laws. Because laws now determine the ends according to their general validity, if one abstracts from the personal difference between rational beings and all the content of their private ends, a whole of all ends (both of rational beings as ends in themselves and of their own ends, which each one may set itself) in a systematic connection, ie a realm of ends, can be thought of, which is possible according to the above principles.
为了从这个角度判断自己及其行为，每个理性存在者的概念都必须通过其意志的所有准则将自己视为普遍立法者，这导致了一个非常富有成果的概念，即王国的概念 目的。
但是，对于一个王国，我理解不同的理性存在者通过普通法的系统联合。 因为法律现在根据它们的普遍有效性来决定目的，如果一个人从理性存在者和他们私人目的的所有内容之间的个人差异中抽象出来，所有目的的整体（作为目的的理性存在者和他们自己的目的） ，每个人都可以自己设定）在一个系统的联系中，即一个目的领域，可以被认为是根据上述原则是可能的。
For rational beings are all subject to the law that each of them should never treat themselves and all others as mere means, but always at the same time as ends in themselves. But this gives rise to a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom which, because these laws aim at the relationship of these beings to one another as ends and means, can be called a kingdom of ends (of course only an ideal).
A rational being, however, belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends if it is indeed generally legislative therein, but is also subject to these laws themselves. It belongs to it as supreme if, as legislative, it is not subject to any will of another. The rational being must always regard itself as legislative in a realm of ends made possible by freedom of will, whether it be as a member or as the head. However, it cannot claim the place of the latter merely through the maxim of its will, but only when it is a completely independent being without need and limitation of its ability adequate to its will. <...>
因为所有有理性的人都服从这样的法则，即他们每个人都不应将自己和所有其他人视为纯粹的手段，而应始终同时作为自己的目的。 但这通过共同的客观法则产生了理性存在者的系统联合，也就是说，一个王国，因为这些法则旨在将这些存在者作为目的和手段彼此之间的关系，可以称为目的王国（的 当然只是一个理想）。
然而，如果一个理性的存在确实在其中普遍立法，那么它作为目的王国的成员属于其中，但也服从于这些法律本身。 如果作为立法机构，它不受任何其他人的意志支配，那么它就属于至高无上的。 理性存在者必须始终将自己视为意志自由使之成为可能的目的领域中的立法者，无论它是作为成员还是作为首脑。 然而，它不能仅仅通过其意志的准则来要求后者的位置，而只有当它是一个完全独立的存在而无需和限制其足以满足其意志的能力时。
[1] I. Kant: Collected Writings. Academy edition. Volume IV. Berlin 1903, pp. 428-434.
[2] I present this sentence here as a postulate. The reasons for this will be found in the last section.
[3] Don't think that the trivial: quod tibi non vis fieri etc. can serve as a guide or principle here. For it is derived only from that, though with various qualifications; it cannot be a general law, for it does not contain the basis of duties towards oneself, not of loving duties towards others (since many would gladly accept that others should not do him good, if only he could feel embarrassed to do them good show), finally not of the duties owed to one another; for the criminal would argue against his punishing judges for this reason, etc.
[4] I may be at arrogant here to cite examples to illustrate this principle, for those which first explained the categorical imperative and its formula can all serve the same purpose here.
Last change: 11:25 11.10.2005
